Arguments for the Existence of God Exemplify Divine Hiddenness
I recently heard Alex O’Connor (host of the Within Reason podcast) offer an interesting perspective on the problem of divine hiddenness, or the idea that if God existed, He would make His existence more obvious to everyone. Yet God’s existence is not obvious, and it may be easy to doubt and disbelieve, which is a problem for theism. O’Connor believes this is one of the most convincing arguments against God’s existence (along with the problem of evil, or why an all-powerful, all-loving god would allow so much suffering in the world).
One issue O’Connor has pointed to is that if God exists and wants us to know of His existence, it seems strange He would expect us to construct philosophical arguments for His existence. Surely, if God existed, His existence would be obvious and not require various arguments found in natural theology (e.g. ontological, causal, and moral arguments), which are not considered convincing by everyone who encounters them. Not everyone finds them immediately clear. Some may take issue with certain premises involved, including the precise meaning of the premises.
Furthermore, it is questionable whether these types of arguments are ‘natural’ (in the sense that we are predisposed to come up with them). These arguments arose when humans developed philosophy. For much of human history, we lived animistically, living in a world inhabited by many spirits. Animism is the earliest form of religion, whereas monotheism came much later, with syllogistic arguments for the existence of God arising much later after this. And today, most people who belong to animistic or polytheistic religions do not embrace monotheism after discovering arguments for the existence of God.
In a sense, therefore, arguments for the existence of God could be self-defeating. They could all fall under the umbrella problem of divine hiddenness. In other words, the fact that these arguments are not universal, nor universally accepted, might count as evidence against the existence of God. If God were truly all-powerful and all-loving, then we would expect He would make His existence undeniable, rather than let humans develop philosophy and create arguments for His existence, which only some people would be convinced by.
On the other hand, this example of divine hiddenness could only be a problem if we’re arguing for the existence of the omni-God, that is, a deity that is omnipotent (all-powerful), omnibenevolent (all-loving), omniscient (all-knowing), and omnipresent (everywhere). If, instead, we propose a ‘limited God hypothesis’ — defended by philosophers like Philip Goff — then the problem of divine hiddenness is less of a problem or not a problem at all. God could be all-loving but be limited in power, in which case He might desire that everyone knows of His existence but He is limited in his powers to make that happen. Consistent with His level of powers, people developing the ability to argue for His existence is the best He could hope for.
Yet perhaps one of the arguments for God’s existence is not an example of divine hiddenness. This would be the argument from religious experience. According to this argument, religious experiences are genuine perceptions of a divine reality. What distinguishes this argument from the others (e.g. ontological arguments and the cosmological argument) is that it refers to a direct encounter with, supposedly, God Himself. These experiences can be considered a rebuttal of the divine hiddenness; in the religious experience, God is not hidden but appears to the person vividly — more real than anything else they’ve ever experienced.
Nevertheless, I think the argument from religious experience also falls prey to the problem of divine hiddenness, for multiple reasons. First, not everyone who has a religious, mystical, or spiritual experience is convinced that the divine entity they encountered exists outside of their minds. These altered states of consciousness (featuring this type of entity) are also not universal. Altered states may be common, but various influences — such as culture, expectations, and prior beliefs — can influence the type of entity encountered (if one is encountered at all).
More generally, religious experiences featuring a divine encounter are rare. Often, they occur through culturally developed techniques (e.g. meditation, prayer, and psychedelic use); spontaneously (but not for everyone); or during life-threatening or existentially challenging situations (again, only for some people). We also have naturalistic explanations, which pinpoint the divine as internally — rather than externally — generated; so it is not obvious that divine encounters refer to an external divine reality. Some may consider the naturalistic explanations more parsimonious. Additionally, some people seem more predisposed to have religious experiences than others. This fact is odd (if we assume God exists), but less so under the assumption that He does not exist.
Finally, this type of experience will not shift people’s convictions unless they’ve had the experience themselves. As William James argues in The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902), “Mystical states, when well developed, usually are, and have the right to be, absolutely authoritative over the individuals to whom they come.” But he adds, “No authority emanates from them which should make it a duty for those who stand outside of them to accept their revelations uncritically.” In other words, those who have not had spiritual experiences are justified in being sceptical of claims made by those who have had them.
The reasons above underline that even personal experiences of ‘God’ may not be sufficient to warrant belief in God. Therefore, unless we presuppose the existence of a God of limited ability (but just how limited is that deity?), then it appears that philosophical arguments for the existence of God exemplify the problem of divine hiddenness. This still leaves the non-resistant non-believer — the person who is open to theism but unconvinced by arguments for the position — with the problem of what kind of event or experience would justify belief in God.
This would have to be the kind of event or experience that every reasonable person would have to agree, based on the evidence, has its source in divinity. Perhaps this would be a personal religious experience that is undeniable in what it reveals (but does any experience undeniably reveal the supernatural?) It could be a personal experience most simply explained by God’s existence. Or it might be a global (or at least widespread) experience of the presence of God, perhaps showcasing divine attributes like omnipotence, omnibenevolence, and omniscience. However, even in an improbable scenario like this, we could always ask whether the event is naturalistic, rather than divine, in nature. The event might, for instance, have an extraterrestrial cause, such as a visitation or intervention from an unimaginably advanced alien lifeform. I think this helps to bring into focus a key problem of divine hiddenness: what, exactly, should count as sufficient evidence for belief in God, and what doesn’t. I’m inclined to believe that individual differences (in personality and cognitive style) can go some way in explaining why divine hiddenness remains a glaring problem for some, whereas, for other people, the fact of God’s existence is — at least to them — plain to see.
Originally published at https://www.samwoolfe.com on October 14, 2024.
